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Immigration policy is a minefield of controver-sial issues, and among the most explosive arethose programs that permit low-skilled foreign
nationals to work in the same labor market as U.S.
citizens and permanent resident aliens. Because
such endeavors have been undertaken in the past,
they have a track record and have been the subject
of extensive research.  There is no need to speculate
about what might happen if any new such venture
— such as that proposed by the Bush Administra-
tion on January 7, 2004 — were to be enacted.
The outcome is easily predicted.
The Traditional Role
The origin of guestworker policy in the United States
and its historic role has been as a national emer-
gency program.  During both World Wars and the
Korean Conflict, extensive reliance was made on
such endeavors. Guestworker programs were in-
cluded among other policies created during times
of national peril such as wage and price controls
and the relaxing of antitrust laws. They are extraor-
dinary policies to be used as a last resort — and
then only as temporary measures. Unlike other ex-
treme measures that were quickly abandoned after
the wars were over, however, guestworker programs
have proven to be difficult to end. Starting such
programs has always been far easier than stopping
them.  Moreover, they all have unintended nega-
tive consequences that must be included in any as-
sessment of such programs.
The First Bracero Program. Only months after Con-
gress enacted the most restrictive immigration leg-
islation of its time, the Immigration Act of 1917,
the first publicly sanctioned foreign-worker program
was initiated.  Responding to strong pressure from
agricultural growers of the Southwest, the Immi-
gration Act of 1917 contained a provision granting
entry to “temporary” workers from Western Hemi-
sphere nations who would otherwise be considered
inadmissible.  The Secretary of Labor was autho-
rized to exempt such persons (in this instance, Mexi-
cans) from the ban on immigrants over the age of
16 who could not read. In May 1917, with the
nation officially at war with Germany, a temporary
farmworker program for unskilled Mexican workers
was created.  It was later expanded to permit the
employment of some of these laborers in non-farm
work.  When the program was announced, a num-
ber of rules and regulations were set forth.  Ostensi-
bly, these rules were designed to protect both citi-
zen workers and Mexican workers and to ensure that
the Mexicans returned to their country when their
work was completed. As soon became apparent,
however, “these elaborate rules were unenforced.” 1
This temporary-worker program was estab-
lished during World War I. The war ended in 1918,
but the program was extended until 1922.  In later
years the program came to be referred to as “the first
bracero program.”2   The term bracero is a corrup-
tion of the Spanish word brazo, which means “arm.”
(Literally, the term means “one who works with his
arms.”)  The program was terminated in 1922
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because it could no longer be justified as a national
defense policy.  Organized labor contended that the
program had undermined the economic welfare of citi-
zen workers.  Other critics argued that labor shortages
no longer existed, but that greedy employers wanted
the program to continue so that they could continue
to tap a cheap source of docile workers.  During the
life span of the program, 76,862 Mexican workers were
admitted to the United States.  Of this number only
34,922 returned to Mexico.3  Thus, the program
spawned illegal immigration.
The Mexican Labor Program. With the advent of
World War II, the military manpower requirements of
the United States and the related need for laborers in
manufacturing led to assertions that another labor
shortage existed in the nation’s agricultural sector.
Growers in the Southwest had foreseen these develop-
ments before the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. They
had made two fateful decisions: first, to again tap the
pool of cheap labor in Mexico in order to fill the al-
leged manpower deficit; and second, to ask the federal
government to again serve as the delivery vehicle.  The
initial request in 1941 for the establishment of a new
contract labor program was denied, but by mid-1942
the federal government had come to favor the program.
The government of Mexico, however, balked at the
prospect.  In the 1940s the Mexican economy was flour-
ishing.  Mexican workers feared that they might be
drafted if they went to the United States, they had
bitter memories of the efforts to “repatriate” Mexicans
in the 1930s, and they were aware of the discrimina-
tory treatment afforded people of Mexican ancestry
throughout much of the American Southwest.
Negotiations between the two governments
ultimately resulted in a formal agreement. In August
1942, the U.S. Congress created the Mexican Labor
Program — more commonly known as the Bracero
Program.  Originally included within an omnibus ap-
propriations bill known as Public Law 45 (P.L. 45),
this program was extended by subsequent enactments
until 1947.  According to P.L. 45, braceros were per-
mitted to work only in the agricultural sector.  If they
were found working in any other industry, they were
subject to immediate deportation.  Although the agree-
ment expired on December 31, 1947, it continued
informally and without regulation until 1951.  In that
year, under the guise of a labor shortage caused by the
Korean conflict, the bracero concept was officially re-
vived by P.L. 78.  This legislation was extended on three
separate occasions until the program was unilaterally
terminated by the United States on December 31,
1964.
Under P.L. 78, originally only Mexican work-
ers could be hired.  Their numbers varied each year
but averaged several hundred thousand workers.  Its
biggest year was in 1959 when 439,000 braceros were
employed.  Employers were required to pay the pre-
vailing agriculture wage, provide free housing, provide
adequate meals at a reasonable charge, and pay the cost
of transportation from government reception centers
near the border to the worksite.  As in the earlier bracero
program, these requirements often were not met.4
Braceros were exempt from U.S. Social Security and
income taxes, which meant that they received
more income than a citizen worker employed at the
identical wage rate.
In Mexico, the federal government determined
the actual allocation process by which workers would
be selected from the various states.  The Mexican state
governments in turn made similar decisions for their
cities and other political subdivisions.  Nevertheless,
there were many more applicants than job openings in
every designated labor market where recruitment oc-
curred.  Corruption in the allocation process soon be-
came widespread at the local level.  Potential workers
often were forced to pay a mordida (a bribe; literally,
“a bite”) if they wished to be chosen.
The bracero program demonstrated precisely
how alien labor policies can adversely affect citizen
workers in the United States.  Agricultural employ-
ment in the Southwest was virtually removed from
competition with the nonagricultural sector.  The avail-
ability of Mexican workers significantly depressed ex-
isting wage levels in some regions, moderated wage
increases that would have occurred in their absence,
and sharply compressed the duration of employment
(i.e., income earning opportunities) for many citizen
farmworkers.5
In its thorough report on the bracero program
in 1952, President Truman’s Commission on Migra-
tory Labor found that “wages by States [for agricul-
tural workers] were inversely related to the supply of
alien labor.”6   Citizen farmworkers in the Southwest
simply could not compete with braceros.  The fact that
braceros were captive workers who were totally subject
to the unilateral demands of employers made them
especially appealing to many business owners.  It also
led to extensive charges of abuse of workers by em-
ployers as most of the provisions for the protection of
braceros’ wage rates and working conditions were ei-
ther ignored or circumvented.7  Moreover, the bracero
program was a significant factor in the rapid exodus of
rural Mexican Americans between 1950 and 1970 to
urban labor markets, where employment and housing
were often difficult to find.8
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The drive to repeal Public Law 78 was led by
the AFL-CIO, various Mexican American groups, and
an array of other community organizations generally
concerned with the welfare of low-income workers. The
Kennedy administration, which came into office in
1961, did not initially support repealing the program.
Instead, the administration sought significant amend-
ments to the law that were designed to strengthen the
protection of domestic workers from the adverse ef-
fects of the program.9 In mid-1961, the Department
of Labor began setting an “adverse effect wage rate” for
each state. These were minimum wage rates that the
department determined had to be paid to prevent
braceros from undercutting the wages of citizen work-
ers. In most cases, the adverse effect wage rates were
actually higher than the prevailing wages. They had to
be offered to citizen workers if the agricultural em-
ployer also intended to hire foreign workers. Under
these terms, the bracero program became much less
attractive to employers. The bitter political struggle
ended in 1963 when the program was extended for
one more year with the understanding that it would
not be renewed after December 31, 1964. This was
22 years after it had been started. Ending the formal
program did not stop its consequences as thousands of
former braceros continued to come and seek jobs in
southwestern agriculture, albeit as illegal immigrants.
The British West Indies Labor Program. Following
the precedent of the Mexican Labor Program, the U.S.
government established a similar nonimmigrant pro-
gram to recruit workers from the British West Indies
(Jamaica, the Bahamas, St. Lucia, St. Vincent,
Dominica, and Barbados).  An intergovernmental agree-
ment was signed in April 1943 pertaining to the sup-
ply of agricultural workers.  The agreement became
the British West Indies (BWI) Program.  The BWI
program was established in response to concerns voiced
by employers along the U.S. east coast that they, too,
were experiencing wartime manpower shortages. Be-
cause many of the potential BWI workers spoke
English, they offered an advantage to employers over
the Mexican workers recruited for the bracero program.
Like the bracero program, BWI was formalized on the
basis of P.L. 45 and was operative from 1943 to 1947.
In terms of aggregate number — about 19,000 work-
ers a year — the BWI program was small compared to
the bracero program. But its impact was substantial in
the particular agricultural labor markets where these
workers were employed.10   Of the 11 east coast states
that participated in the program, Florida was by far
the largest recipient.  During the actual war years, BWI
recruits were also permitted to work in the
nonagricultural sector.
During the years 1947-1952, the BWI pro-
gram was converted into a temporary-worker program,
as allowed under the provisions of the Immigration
Act of 1917.  Tripartite contracts were drawn up be-
tween U.S. employers, the foreign workers, and the
governments of the participating nations of the West
Indies.  The U.S. government was not a direct partici-
pant.  Travel and recruitment expenses were paid en-
tirely by U.S. employers, and the workers who were
recruited were employed only in agriculture.
A review of the BWI program by the President’s
Commission on Migratory Labor in 1951 led to con-
demnation of the administration of the program. The
Commission attacked the lack of “vigilance for the pro-
tection of living and working standards” of these
workers.11
During the legislative debate over the continu-
ation of the Mexican Labor Program in 1951, east coast
employers — especially those in Florida — specifically
requested that BWI workers not be included in the
legislation.  The language of the bill was changed and
only “agricultural workers from the Republic of Mexico”
were included.  The east coast employers preferred to
keep the BWI program as it was, and hence the
program continued to function according to the
provisions of the Immigration Act of 1917.
The Non-Traditional Role
The vastness and complexity of the U.S. labor market
has also, on occasions, led to the use of guestworker
programs for low skilled workers during peacetime
under certain circumstances.  There are sometimes spot
shortages of labor to which the normal working of a
relatively free labor market cannot easily respond.  These
adjustment problems are normally due to geographi-
cal factors (i.e., isolated labor markets) or seasonal con-
ditions (i.e., time limits on the duration of labor de-
mand). But even in these seemingly logical cases, there
have usually been undesirable side effects that
challenge the efficacy of their replication in the future.
The H-2 Program. In 1952, the Immigration and
Nationality Act was passed. Among its many provi-
sions was the formal creation of the various entry cat-
egories for nonimmigrants.  Among these was the H-2
program for “other temporary workers.” Initially, it was
agricultural employers who made the greatest use of
the program. Its height of usage was in 1969 when
over 69,000 visas were issued.  In the Southwest
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especially, the arid nature of the much of the land
means that it is often not possible for farmworkers to
live nearby.  Hence, either migrant workers who are
citizens must be hired or foreign workers must be re-
cruited to do the seasonal planting and harvesting.  The
program also became popular with sugarcane growers
in Florida and apple growers in the Northeast who
argued that the arduous work only existed for short
periods of time making it difficult to attract and hold
citizen workers. But other non-agricultural workers were
also sought to do various service jobs that were of “a
lower status than those entering on H-1 visas” (i.e.,
temporary workers “of distinguished merit or abil-
ity”).12   In 1986, IRCA split the H-2 visa into two
separate temporary visas — the H-1A for non-agricul-
tural workers, and the H-2A for agricultural workers.
Theoretically, H-2 workers can only be admit-
ted if unemployed citizen workers cannot be found to
do the work. But the entire process of testing labor
market availability and the appropriate wage rate to be
paid has been a never-ending source of controversy.  As
a result (and because of the growing availability of ille-
gal immigrants), usage of the program has declined
significantly from its peak in 1969 — although usage
of H-2B visas (for non-agricultural seasonal workers)
has been soaring in recent years.
H-2 programs have also been criticized for be-
ing forms of indentured servitude.  The participating
workers are totally dependent on their employer.  They
are tied to their jobs by contractual terms.  For this
reason it is believed that they are preferred workers by
employers if they can get them.13
The Virgin Islands H-2 Program.  In the 1950s, the
H-2 program was used on the U.S. Virgin Islands to
allow unskilled workers from various neighboring is-
lands to work in the agricultural and tourist indus-
tries.  By the 1960s, these foreign workers were being
employed “for any job” on the Islands. More and more
jobs ceased to be temporary so by the end of the 1960s
H-2 workers accounted for almost half of the entire
workforce. As the cost of living on the Islands is high,
citizen workers were reluctant to work for the low wages
paid to the H-2 workers, and their unemployment in-
creased dramatically.  In the meantime, housing, edu-
cation, and social conditions worsened and the H-2
program was described as being “the biggest single
problem” on the Island.14    As the number of H-2
workers kept increasing, there was even fear that the
native-born population might lose political control of
their homeland. Efforts were made to stop the chil-
dren of the H-2 workers from attending public schools
but federal courts intervened. As the economy became
dependent on H-2 workers a two-tiered labor market
developed.  Ultimately the program was abandoned in
1975 but most H-2 workers were allowed to adjust
their status to become permanent resident aliens be-
cause, by this time, they had put down roots in their
new land.
The Guam Program. The island of Guam also made
extensive use of the H-2 workers.  In reality, the H-2
program ratified a practice that was already underway.
Foreign workers had been recruited by defense con-
tractors working on the rebuilding of the economy fol-
lowing World War II.  When the H-2 program was
created in 1952, many of these workers were granted
this status even though they had been on Guam for
many years. Before long, a “triple wage system” evolved:
one for “state siders;” one for the native-born on Guam;
and the lowest wages for H-2 workers.15   As criticisms
mounted about the H-2 workers receiving “slave
wages,” the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) began to phase-out the program for non-
defense sector jobs and eventually for defense-related
jobs, beginning in 1959.  But there was immense criti-
cism by employers of these attempts.  Finally, the U.S.
Department of Labor acknowledged that employers
were not complying with the H-2 provisions and
that as efforts to end the program were initiated, ille-
gal immigration soared.  Ending the program was no
easy feat.
Combat Illegal Immigration?
As the scale of illegal immigration was finally acknowl-
edged as an issue of national concern the 1970s,
guestworker programs were proposed as a possible rem-
edy by several scholars as well as by some employer
groups.16 Meanwhile, President Jimmy Carter re-
quested the National Commission on Manpower Policy
(NCMP) in August 1978 to study whether the exist-
ing H-2 provisions of the Immigration and National-
ity Act should be expanded as an alternative to em-
ployers’ (especially those in agriculture) use of illegal
immigrants.  After lengthy study of the idea, the Com-
mission advised the President in May 1979 that it was
“strongly against” any such expansion of the H-2
program.17
During this same time span, Congress estab-
lished the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy (SCIRP) chaired by Rev. Theodore
Hesburgh.  It was requested to study all elements of
the nation’s immigration and refugee policies and to
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make relevant recommendations for changes.  The no-
tion of creating a guestworker program as a possible
remedy to illegal immigration was given intensive
scrutiny and was eventually rejected.18
In follow-up hearings jointly held by the sub-
committees on immigration of both the Senate and
the House of Representatives, Rev. Hesburgh carefully
explained that:
The idea of a large, temporary work program is tre-
mendously attractive.  Perhaps a better word though,
would be “seductive.” There is a superficial plausibility
to this argument and the Commission gave it serious
consideration for more than a year and a half.  I can
recall being very much entranced by it when I first joined
the Commission.  In the end, we were persuaded, after
much study, that it would be a mistake to launch such a
program.19
He elaborated the reasons for its rejection as follows:
1. A large, temporary worker program “would have
to have some limits which would have to be en-
forced.  It wouldn’t be a completely open program.”
Who would be eligible?  What kind of jobs can
they hold?  How long can they stay?  Can they
renew their participation? Who is going to enforce
these terms and how capable would such a body
be to perform these tasks?
2. “It is difficult to turn off such a program once it
gets started.”
3. “A large program would build a dependency on
foreign labor in certain sectors of the economy.”
4. “Certain jobs would be identified with foreigners,”
which would effectively stigmatize such jobs.
5. “A second class of aliens would be established in
our country who are not fully protected by the law
and its entitlements and who could not
participate effectively in mainstream institutions.”
6. Without the strict enforcement of employer sanc-
tions against hiring other illegal immigrants else-
where in the economy, a temporary worker pro-
gram “would stimulate new migration pressures in
the long run, and again we [would] have the
specter of law disrespected as we have now.”
In summing up, he concluded:
We do not think it wise to propose a program with
potentially harmful consequences to the United States
as a whole.20
Responding to the SCIRP report, the Reagan
Administration accepted to wisdom of most of its con-
clusion but it proposed “an experimental temporary
worker program for Mexican nationals” be included in
the reform legislation and, if it proved feasible, it be
expanded significantly in scale.21
When Congress took up immigration reform
in 1982, the sponsors of the original bill, Sen. Alan
Simpson (R-Wyo.) and Rep. Romano Mazzoli (D-Ky.),
did not include a temporary worker program.  It did
propose liberalizing the existing H-2 program (which
did not have any ceiling on the number of workers
who could be admitted).  Over the ensuing five years
as the various versions of what would become the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) worked
its way though the legislative process, no issue proved
to be more difficult or controversial than efforts to add
a guestworker program for agricultural workers to the
bill.  Numerous efforts were made.  Indeed, after fail-
ing to pass Congress in both 1982 and 1984, it ap-
peared that the legislation would die in 1986 for this
very reason.22  It passed only after the adoption of an
extremely controversial amendment offered by Rep.
Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) that eventually would give
permanent resident alien status (a green card) to any
person who could prove he or she had worked in per-
ishable agriculture for 90 days between May 1, 1985,
and May 1, 1986.  It was, in reality, a second amnesty
added to the general amnesty provided for elsewhere
in the legislation. The provision set off a firestorm of
protest but it was given a debate rule that prohibited
any changes in this particular provision to be made on
the House floor.  Representatives opposed to the com-
promise had only one choice:  kill the whole reform
package or accept this amendment as is.  The idea could
not withstand a vote on its own merits.  Despite such
criticism, the amendment enabled IRCA to be passed
and signed into law by President Reagan in 1986. As a
consequence, this adjustment program — known as
the Special Agricultural Workers program (SAW) —
led to 1.2 million persons applying for its adjustment
of status benefits.  Of these, 997,000 applications were
approved.  The number of applicants far exceeded
anyone’s estimation of the number who would be
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eligible.  The explanation for the large number of ap-
plicants was the widespread usage of fraudulent docu-
ments that were used to claim eligibly.  Indeed,
The New York Times described the SAW program as
being “one of the most extensive immigration frauds
ever perpetrated against the United States
government.”23
Over concern of what the impact of IRCA
might be on the agricultural industry, the law con-
tained provisions to create the Commission on Agri-
cultural Workers (CAW) in 1986.  It was chaired by
Henry Voss, the Director of the California Department
of Food and Agriculture.  Despite being dispropor-
tionately composed of agricultural industry represen-
tatives, the final report of CAW was remarkably frank.
After six years of study, it described a story whereby
the living and working conditions of farmworkers had
shown little if any improvement due largely to the con-
tinuing influx of illegal immigrants.24   It boldly stated
that “there is a general oversupply of farm labor na-
tionwide” due to the fact that “unauthorized migrants
continue to cross the southern border in large
numbers.”25  It noted:
The surplus of labor in most areas militates against
improvements in wages and working conditions for sea-
sonal agricultural employees… Illegal immigration has
a negative effect on workers who are faced with
increasing job competition and employers who are
concerned about their continuing access to a legal
labor supply.26
The report stated that “employer sanctions have been
ineffective” with fraudulent documents being the ma-
jor cause for their failure. Based on the experience of
the industry with SAW, the report concluded that
“worker-specific and/or industry-specific legalization
programs as contained in IRCA should not be the basis of
future immigration policy.”27
Within three years of the passage of IRCA, it
was clear that the legislation had not succeeded in its
efforts to stop illegal immigration.  Employer sanc-
tions, which were the “centerpiece” of the deterrent
measures, were being circumvented by the use of
fraudulent documents and by inadequate enforcement
personnel and funds. Congress, rather than address
these inadequacies, ignored the issue when it passed
the Immigration Act of 1990, dramatically increasing
the annual level of legal immigration to the country
based on the  assumption that the “back door” of ille-
gal immigration had been closed.  The premise was, of
course, false. This legislation did, however, create
another bipartisan commission to study the nation’s
immigration system. It was given seven years (six in
reality) to conduct its investigation.  The Commission
on Immigration Reform (CIR), as it was called, was
chaired for most of its life by the late Barbara Jordan.
CIR identified illegal immigration as the most press-
ing problem confronting the nation’s immigration
policy and recommended a number of policy changes.
But with regard to guestworker programs, it adamantly
rejected any notion that they be viewed as part of any
solution. In its final report, CIR stated that it “remains
opposed to implementation of a large-scale program
for temporary admission of lesser-skilled and unskilled
workers.”28   It went on to say specifically that “a
guestworker program would be a grievous mistake.”29
The Commission stated in unequivocal terms the
reasons for its conclusions:
1. “Guestworker programs have depressed wages.”
2. Those whose wages are most adversely affected are
“unskilled American workers, including recent im-
migrants who may have originally entered to per-
form needed labor but who can be displaced by
newly entering guestworkers.”
3. “Foreign guestworkers often are more exploitable
than a lawful U.S. worker, particularly when an
employer threatens deportation if workers
complain about wages or working conditions.”
4. “The presence of large numbers of guestworkers in
particular localities — such as rural counties with
agricultural interests — presents substantial costs
in housing, healthcare, social services, schooling,
and basic infrastructure that are borne by the
broader community and even by the federal gov-
ernment rather than by the employers who
benefit from inexpensive labor.”
5. “Guestworker programs also fail to reduce unau-
thorized migration” [because] “they tend to en-
courage and exacerbate illegal movements that per-
sist long after the guest programs end.” …[and]…
“guestworkers themselves often remain permanently
and illegally in the country in violation of the
conditions of their admission.”
Concluding Observations
The actual program experience of the past as well as
the wise counsel of the distinguished Americans who
served on the host of national commissions cited in
this paper all warn in the starkest of terms against
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pursuing such programs. I know of no other element
of immigration policy in which the message not to do
something is so unequivocal.
         The heart of the problem is that guestworker
programs seek to reconcile two sharply conflicting goals:
the need to protect citizen workers from the competi-
tion of foreign workers who are willing to work for
wages and in conditions that few citizens would toler-
ate versus the wishes of some employers who rely on
labor-intensive production and service techniques to
secure a plentiful supply of low-cost workers.  In addi-
tion, there are always unforeseen side effects that harm
the wider society.
With 34 million low-wage workers in the cur-
rent civilian labor force, the problem to confront is not
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a shortage of low-skilled workers; it is the oversupply
of from nine to 12 million illegal immigrants that needs
to be addressed. Getting illegal immigrants out of the
labor force should be the first order of business for
policymakers. Neither guestworker programs nor am-
nesties of any kind should be part of the efforts to end
this labor-market nightmare. Guestworker programs
do nothing to stop further illegal immigration and, in
fact, they serve to condone past illegal conduct while
encouraging more illegal immigration.
Except in national emergencies, guestworker
programs are bad public policy. They may meet the
short-term pleas of private interest groups, but they
can never meet the higher standard of being public
policies that serve the national interest.
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By Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Immigration policy is a minefield of controversial iss-ues, and among the most explosive are those programsthat permit low-skilled foreign nationals to work in
the same labor market as U.S. citizens and permanent
resident aliens.  Because such endeavors have been under-
taken in the past, they have a track record and have been
the subject of extensive research.  There is no need to
speculate about what might happen if any new such ven-
ture — such as that proposed by the Bush Administration
on January 7, 2004 — were to be enacted.  The outcome
is easily predicted.
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